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Abstract   
Achieving low unemployment in an environment of weak growth is a major policy challenge; 
a more egalitarian distribution of hours worked could be the key to solving it. Whether work-
sharing actually increases employment, however, has been debated controversially. In this 
article we present stylized facts on the distribution of hours worked and discuss the role of 
work-sharing for a sustainable economy. Building on recent developments in labor market 
theory we review the determinants of working long hours and its effect on well-being. Finally, 
we survey work-sharing reforms in the past. While there seems to be a consensus that work-
sharing in the Great Depression in the U.S. and in the Great Recession in Europe was 
successful in reducing employment losses, perceptions of the work-sharing reforms 
implemented between the 1980s and early 2000s are more ambivalent. However, even the 
most critical evaluations of these reforms provide no credible evidence of negative 
employment effects; instead, the overall success of the policy seems to depend on the 
economic and institutional setting, as well as the specific details of its implementation. 
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1. Introduction 
For decades policy makers and labor unions have periodically expressed interest in work-
sharing – the redistribution of working hours between the employed and unemployed – to 
increase employment, especially during recessions. The struggle over the length of the work 
day was already a central topic in Marx’ Capital Vol. I (Marx and Engels 1968), and “three-
hour shifts or a fifteen-hour week” were the logical outcome in Keynes’ (1930) vision of 
saturated capitalism.2 In Europe’s post-war societies trade unions heavily advocated general 
working time reductions, which were in part subsequently implemented by law or in 
bargaining processes with employers. The latest revival of work-sharing policies took place in 
the aftermath of the Great Recession in many European countries. However, many of these 
work-sharing programs were designed as short-term crisis measures and have already expired. 
While growth and correspondingly demand for labor are still low in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession, there is increasing concern that higher growth might be environmentally harmful. 
Leading earth system and environmental scientists repeatedly warn that the scale and intensity 
of current economic activity seriously threatens the “safe operating space of humanity” 
(Rockström et al., 2009, Steffen et al. 2015). Solving the social problems arising from the 
current economic recession without fueling the ecological crisis poses a novel policy 
challenge. Traditional policies to increase employment and equity have relied on economic 
growth. There is a well-documented short-run (Ball et al. 2013a, Okun 1962) and long-run 
(e.g. Blanchard 1997, Ball 1999, Karanassou et al. 2008, Stockhammer and Klär 2011, Sturn 
2013) relationship between growth and aggregate employment. However, at a given level of 
aggregate labor demand, the employment rate might be increased through re-distributing 
hours and jobs more equally within the labor force, making work-sharing an important 
economic policy tool in a low-growth economy. In recent years work-sharing has therefore 
received increased attention from ecological economists (Antal 2014, Kallis et al. 2013, 
Pullinger 2014, Schor 2005, Jackson 2009, Victor 2008). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Keynes (1930) predicted that productivity would increase strongly in the next century. Over 
time, this would more and more translate into shorter work-days instead of income growth: 
“[T]he economic problem may be solved, or be at least within sight of solution, within a 
hundred years [...]. Thus for the first time since his creation man will be faced with his real, 
his permanent problem – how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, how to 
occupy the leisure, which science and compound interest will have won for him, to live 
wisely and agreeably and well.” While Keynes’ predictions about productivity growth were 
accurate, he clearly overestimated the extent to which this would be used to shorten working 
time. 
3	  
	  
Since an unequal distribution of hours and jobs also has other negative economic and social 
consequences, such as an unequal distribution of wages and reduced well-being due to un- 
and under-employment for some workers and burnout and stress for others, work-sharing 
might have additional positive externalities. Nevertheless, the success of work-sharing is 
debated controversially amongst economists. The standard neoclassical argument is that 
work-sharing reforms backfire because they increase labor costs per unit of output, which 
induces a substitution from labor to capital and hereby lowers aggregate employment. While 
neoclassical models therefore predict negative macroeconomic effects, the empirical evidence 
seems to allow for a much broader variety of possible outcomes. In a review of the literature 
we show that even the most prominent studies that are often cited to argue against work-
sharing, can provide no credible evidence of negative employment effects. 
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents stylized facts on the evolution of 
working hours since the 1950s as well as the cross-country relationship between average 
working hours and the distribution of working hours. In section 3 we discuss the question of 
what determines the number of hours people work, in section 4 we address the consequences 
of unequal working hours on well-being and equity. Section 5 gives an overview of work-
sharing reforms from the Great Depression to the Great Recession, and discusses empirical 
studies evaluating these reforms. Section 6 concludes. 
  
2. Stylized facts on working time  
In most industrialized countries average annual hours worked per employee have noticeably 
declined since the 1950’s (plot 1 in figure 1), while the employment to population ratio has 
slightly increased (plot 2). Behind this rather stable employment to population ratio, lies on 
the one hand the rising female labor force participation (plot 3), which is partially offset by 
the shorter number of years spent in the labor market due to trend increases in average years 
of schooling on the one hand, and earlier retirement and population aging on the other.  
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Figure 1: Labor market trends in industrialized countries 
Source: Plot 1 and 2: The Conference Board total Economy Database 2015, annual hours include paid overtime 
and exclude paid hours that are not worked due to sickness, holidays. Employment to population ratio: persons 
employed/midyear population. Plot 3 and 4: OECD Labor Force Statistics 2015. Part-time employment is 
defined as people in employment (employees and self-employed) who usually work less than 30 hours per week 
in their main job. 
 
The trend-decline in hours worked per employee since the 1950’s (plot 1) captures two rather 
different episodes. While in the first decades after World War II it was driven by the 
reduction in the workweek and increases in paid vacation, especially since the 1990’s the 
increased part-time share (plot 4) is responsible for lower average hours worked; the large 
majority of these part-time jobs are performed by women (Tijdens 2002). At the same time, 
however, the hours of (male) full-time workers have increased in some countries, especially 
in the US (Prescott et al. 2004, Rogerson 2006). This suggests that while average hours have 
fallen, labor markets have become more segmented and the distribution of hours worked has 
become more unequal (Jacobs and Gerson 2005, Lee et al. 2007). 
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Part-time shares as defined in plot 4, the share of workers working below 30 hours per week, 
strongly underestimate the dispersion of hours across countries and time, since there is a lot of 
variation within the group of part-time workers, ranging from jobs with very low hours to 
almost full-time jobs, and a concentration of very long hours amongst the full-time workers. 
This emphasizes the importance of alternative measures of working time inequality and their 
relationship to average hours. Against this background, the cross-sectional analysis of 
working hour inequality – measured by Gini coefficients of annual hours worked – by 
Salverda and Checchi (2015) is of great interest. Using EU SILC data for 2010, we replicate 
their results for the EU, and additionally also differentiate by gender. 
 
Figure 2: Average hours worked and inequality in hours worked in the EU 
Source: Own calculations using EU SILC 2010. The Ginis were calculated using Stata’s ineqdeco package. 
Following Salverda and Checci (2015) we restricted the sample to the population in the relevant working age 
(20-64 years old) and to the labor force (employed and unemployed by self-definition). Yearly hours worked 
were computed by multiplying the reported number of weekly hours worked (PL060 – numbers of hours usually 
worked per week in main job) with the months spent in the labor market (PL073-74-74-76-80 – number of 
months spent at full-time/part-time work as employee/self-employed/unemployed). 
 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between hours inequality and average annual hours. We find a 
considerable variation in working hours inequality across European countries, ranging from 
0.05 to 0.2 in plot 1 of figure 2 (for men and women combined). Average working hours are 
negatively correlated with hours inequality. This suggests that shorter average hours are not 
driven by overall trends to work less, but instead an increasingly heterogeneous workforce. 
This finding is demonstrated more explicitly in plots 2 and 3, which show the same 
relationship for men and women separately. We find a positive relationship between hours 
inequality and average hours worked across countries for men, and a negative even steeper 
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relationship for women. This suggests that working hours inequality for males is driven by 
some men working very long hours. For women, however, a high working time Gini is driven 
by some women working very few hours. Overall, analyzing the relationship between average 
hours and hours inequality for both genders combined might result in misleading conclusions, 
given that low average hours across countries are caused by different developments for men 
and women. 
 
3. What explains hours worked? 
The popularity of working time reductions for both employers and employees has varied 
strongly throughout history. To understand these fluctuations, it is important to investigate the 
drivers of changes in both annual hours worked as well as the distribution of working time 
within the labor force. This section gives an overview of different theoretical explanations of 
working time, starting with the standard theory of labor markets and its limits, and extending 
it with a Keynesian analysis of labor demand, and a behavioral analysis of labor supply. The 
latter two have only been brought together recently in the literature on the structural causes of 
the Great Recession and the role of rising income inequality (for a review see Van Treeck 
2014). 
 
3.1. Neoclassical labor market theory 
In neoclassical labor market theory, labor supply is determined by wages and non-wage 
income; individuals derive utility from the consumption of goods and leisure and face a labor-
leisure trade-off. Increases in wages lead to both an income and a substitution effect; 
increases in non-wage income, such as unemployment benefits and other social transfers have 
an unambiguously negative effect on labor supply. In this framework, cross-country 
differences in hours worked – such as the diverging trends in working hours of full-time 
workers observed between the U.S. and several European countries since the 1970s – are 
largely explained by differences in tax rates (Davis et al. 2004, Prescott et al. 2004), labor 
market institutions, labor unions and household preferences (Alesina et al. 2005), or 
technology (Rogerson 2006).  
In the neoclassical theory of the labor market, labor supply and demand generally adapt, 
except when market imperfections – such as labor market institutions or labor unions – 
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increase wages above the market-clearing level or reduce the incentive to work at the market 
clearing wage, in which case unemployment is possible (Friedman 1968, Johnson et al. 1986, 
Nickell et al. 2005, Siebert 1997). The origins of the problem is not insufficient labor demand, 
though, but the unwillingness of workers to work for a given wage, thus unemployment is 
voluntary. Moreover, since this theory relies on the representative household in its micro-
foundation of households’ labor supply decisions, inequality in working hours cannot be 
investigated systematically. 
 
3.2. Keynesian theory of labor demand 
In the Keynesian theory of the labor market, labor demand, which is driven by (expected) 
effective demand, plays the crucial role. The fact that effective demand can be at a level 
below the full-employment equilibrium makes involuntary unemployment possible (Keynes 
1936, Rowthorn 1995, Stockhammer 2011). Monetary and fiscal policy can increase 
employment through stimulating aggregate demand and economic growth (Ball 1999, Ball et 
al. 2013b, Eggertsson and Krugman 2012, Reifschneider et al. 2013, Stockhammer and Sturn 
2012, Sturn 2014). Note, however, that the demand constrained variable is aggregate 
employment, and not the employment rate; the latter also depends on the distribution of 
working hours within the labor force. This raises the importance of work-sharing under a low-
growth scenario.  
While the Keynesian literature has emphasized the importance of aggregate demand in 
explaining changes in the labor market, including changes in average hours, it has not paid 
much attention to individual labor supply decisions and thus the distribution of hours. 
 
3.3 Behavioral theories of labor supply 
Behavioral economists criticize the neoclassical labor market theory for ignoring non-material 
considerations of individual labor supply and for neglecting positional considerations and 
peer effects, both of which are important for explaining trends in employment, average hours 
and the distribution of hours.3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For a review and criticism of the theory of ‘voluntary unemployment’ from a behavioral 
economics perspective, see also Frey and Stutzer (2002).   
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A wide range of behavioral studies document the importance of non-material factors for 
overall well-being and happiness (for an overview see Frey and Stutzer 2002 and Easterlin 
1974). Non-material factors – such as appreciation and recognition in the work-place – have 
also been found to play an important role for labor supply decisions (Ellingsen and 
Johannesson 2007) and unemployment has been found to reduce happiness and well-being 
(Clark and Oswald 1994, Knabe et al. 2010, Krueger and Mueller 2012, McKee-Ryan et al. 
2005). As pointed out by Clark and Oswald (1994), though, the magnitude of the adverse 
effect of unemployment on happiness depends on the social context: Workers in areas with 
higher levels of unemployment, and workers in social groups where unemployment is more 
acceptable (such as the youth) experience less declines in  happiness. In a follow-up study 
Clark (2003) also finds that the well-being of unemployed is strongly correlated with the level 
of unemployment in regions and households. Related to this, Topa (2001) finds that the 
duration of unemployment depends on neighborhood characteristics. This links non-material 
factors of labor supply to positional considerations and peer-effects. 
There exists wide evidence that labor supply decisions are dependent on the social and 
economic context. In recent years, labor supply decisions have especially been discussed in 
the context of rising income and wealth inequality. Inequality increases the social distance in 
society, which has been found to be adversely related to happiness and well-being, since 
people care more for their relative incomes – compared to a peer group – than the absolute 
income (Duesenberry 1949, Clark and Oswald 1996). At the firm level, inequality in wage 
raises among peers has been found to strongly increase quits among those with lower raises 
(Dube et al. 2015), and access to information on the relative position in the earnings 
distribution has been found to reduce job satisfaction and increase the willingness to search 
for a new job, especially for workers paid below the median wage of the organizational unit 
and occupation (Card et al. 2012). An general increasing concentration of top incomes in the 
society, as it could be observed over the last decades in many industrialized countries 
(Atkinson et al. 2011, Piketty 2014) has been found to increase conspicuous consumption of 
the top incomes with behavioral spill-over effects to lower income groups, leading to 
consumption emulation by the less affluent (Bertrand and Morse 2013, Veblen 1899). Since 
income growth of lower income households stagnated or declined, these households extended 
their labor supply (and reduced savings, and increased debt) in an attempt to “keep up with 
the Joneses” (Reich 2010, van Treeck 2014). This can partly explain the relationship between 
income inequality and labor supply across countries and over time (Bowles and Park 2005, 
Oh et al. 2012). 
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However conspicuous consumption is not the only positional effect on labor supply. Collewet 
et al. (2015) distinguish between conspicuous consumption, conspicuous work, and 
conspicuous leisure, whereby the first two lead to an increase in labor supply through peer-
effects, whereas the latter leads to an increase in leisure. In the case of conspicuous 
consumption, rising labor supply is a “coping-mechanism” (Reich 2010) to increase 
consumption. Conspicuous work and leisure lead to imitative behavior and therefore 
convergence in labor supply and effort, for which Clark and Oswald (1998), Vendrik (1998) 
and Collewet et al. (2015) provide theoretical and empirical evidence. While it is possible, 
and in fact likely, that all three effects – conspicuous consumption, work, and leisure – are 
present at the same time, Frank (2008) suggests that especially in the US, where labor supply 
increased strongly, conspicuous leisure played a minor role. Therefore positional 
considerations and peer-effects have lead to the desire to work longer hours; however only 
some workers were successful in extending their labor supply, while the incomes and hours of 
others lagged behind.  
 
4. The consequences of unequal hours worked 
In an economy operating below the full-employment equilibrium, longer working hours of 
some will ceteris paribus reduce the employment opportunities of others. Moreover, if longer 
working hours are viewed as a positional externality where workers increasingly compete 
over longer hours beyond their initially desired levels (Neumark and Postlewaite 1998, 
Bowles and Park 2005, Goerke and Hillesheim 2013), public policy aimed at reducing this 
externality could be welfare-enhancing (Frank 2005, Frank 2008). This is even more the case 
if longer working hours also have negative environmental and health effects. Knight et al. 
(2013) suggest negative environmental effects of longer working hours in OECD countries 
across time, however the scale effect of work hours (volume of production and consumption) 
was found to be much larger than the compositional effect (spending income or time budgets). 
Longer working hours have also been associated with adverse health effects and increased 
injuries from work accidents (Caruso 2006, Pencavel 2014). Moreover, a mismatch between 
the actual and preferred hours has been found to reduce life satisfaction (Wooden et al. 2009), 
and self-perceived health (Bell, et al. 2012). While life satisfaction is reduced if the mismatch 
results in over- and underemployment, the adverse health effect is especially strong for those 
working longer hours than desired. 
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Unequal working hours also translate into unequal hourly wages. Bell and Freeman (2001) 
argue that individual longer working hours lead to job promotions and reduce the likelihood 
of job loss in recessions. Inversely, shorter working hours are often associated with lower 
hourly earnings as emphasized especially by the feminist economics literature on the ‘part 
time wage penalty’ (Bardasi and Gornick 2008,  McGinnity and McManus 2007). In addition, 
the feminist economics literature emphasizes the adverse effects of an unequal distribution of 
paid employment on gender equality in the division of household tasks (Rubery et al. 1998, 
Sirianni et al. 2000). 
The negative effects of long and unequal working hours on the environment, health, 
happiness, well-being, earnings, and gender equality, make a strong case for re-distributing 
hours more equally through work-sharing policies. Whether work-sharing works, however, is 
subject to controversy. 
 
5. Has work-sharing worked? Empirical evidence from history 
The perception of work-sharing among economists, and in the public discourse, is ambivalent. 
The standard argument put forward by critics is that the hiring of additional workers in 
response to work-sharing reforms is associated with administrative and other fixed costs of 
employment, which will increase costs per unit of output, reduce productivity, and ultimately 
even reduce employment (Hunt 1999). Moreover, the higher marginal costs of labor will lead 
to a substitution from labor to capital and thus even lower employment (Hunt and Katz 1998). 
In this framework, the negative employment effect is even stronger, if the work time 
reduction is associated with an increase in hourly earnings (Hunt 1999). Another argument 
that could limit the success of work-sharing is that differences in skills between the employed 
and unemployed could constrain the hiring of new workers in response to shorter working 
hours (Freeman 1998). This suggests that the success of work-sharing depends on the overall 
economic environment, i.e. the tightness of the labor market, and education of the 
(underutilized) labor force. The most skeptical argument against work-sharing has been 
known as the “lump-of-output fallacy”. Pointing to the negative relationship between 
unemployment and inflation, this argument suggests that to the extent that unemployment will 
be reduced by work-sharing initially, this will lead to an increased wage-bargaining power of 
workers and subsequently to wage inflation, which will have to be addressed by tight 
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economic policy to increase unemployment and restore the balance in wage-bargaining power 
(Layard et al. 1991).  
Closer inspection of theoretical studies shows that the employment effects of work-sharing 
depend on specific assumptions. For example, in the frequently cited theoretical model by 
Calmfors and Hoel (1988) the employment effect of a working time reduction critically 
depends on whether the overtime premium is constant or progressive; negative employment 
effects are only found with a constant premium. Dominguez et al. (2011) show that the 
macroeconomic effects of work-sharing depend on the extent to which reduced working hours 
are accompanied by productivity increases from shorter work days that offset the adjustment 
costs. Marimon and Zilibotti (2000) argue that the employment effects of work time 
reductions depend on the labor market institutions of a country and that moderate and gradual 
working time reductions are more likely to increase employment than strong cuts in hours. 
Empirically, the employment effects of work-sharing seem to depend strongly on the 
institutional setting (Bosch and Lehndorff 2001, Freeman 1998, Kapteyn et al. 2004). The 
following section will review the empirical literature on work-sharing since the 1930s, and 
discuss which institutional backgrounds led to its success or failure. 
 
5.1 Work-Sharing during the Great Depression in the U.S. 
While work-sharing is mostly associated with labor market policy debates in the 1980s or 
short-time work policies in the recent Great Recession in Europe, its first prominent 
application goes back to the Great Depression and the New Deal Era in the United States. 
Historically, weekly working hours in the manufacturing sector in the United States have 
declined steadily from 70 hours in 1830 to 55 hours in 1890 and 48 hours in 1929.4 In the 
following Great Depression and New Deal, working hours further decreased to 34 hours 
within only 5 years (Whaples 1991, 2001). The reduction of weekly working hours was 
strongly supported by both the Hoover and the Roosevelt administrations. Using the slogan 
‘Job Security by Job Sharing’, president Hoover’s ‘share-the-work’ committee encouraged 
industrial leaders to reduce working hours instead of employment. Shortly after the beginning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Historical working time data for the US are most reliable for the manufacturing sector, 
collected by the Census of Manufacturers. Compared to mining and construction, 
manufacturing workers had the longest average hours; comparisons with the agricultural 
sector are difficult due to data limitations (Whaples 2001). 
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of his presidency, Roosevelt implemented the ‘President’s Reemployment Act’ in 1933, under 
which firms were encouraged to sign an agreement consisting of (1) limiting the work-week 
to 35 hours maximum, (2) raising hourly minimum wages, while not reducing any wages of 
workers earning higher wages, and (3) recognizing workers’ rights to collective bargaining 
(Taylor 2011). While the program was voluntary, compliance of both firms and consumers 
was strongly advertised by the Roosevelt administration. Complying firms were listed at the 
local post offices, and were rewarded with permission to use the ‘Blue Eagle’ in their 
company logos and advertisements, while consumers were encouraged to support products of 
participating firms in a ‘Statement of Cooperation’ (Neumann et al. 2013). Firms’ compliance 
to both Hoovers ‘share-the-work’ committee guidelines, as well as Roosevelt’s ‘President’s 
Reemployment Act’ was very high. Already in early 1933 a survey conducted by the 
Commerce Department found that 80 percent of employers had implemented some form of 
work-sharing, while one fourth of jobs were owed to this policy (Bernstein 2010, p.479). 
The employment effects of work-sharing in the Great Depression are widely acknowledged. 
The fall in industrial production in the Great Depression strongly reduced aggregate 
employment; however “variations in the work week contributed nearly as much as did 
changes in employment to the overall variance in labor input during this period” (Bernanke 
1986, p. 82; see also Bernanke and Powell 1984, and Neumann et al. 2013). Or to put it 
differently, without the reduction in working hours, ceteris paribus, unemployment would 
have increased much more. 
While there seems to be an almost consensus view that work-sharing was essential for the 
economic recovery in the 1930s in the US, there are many divergent criticisms of its 
implementation. On the one hand, standard economic approaches criticize that the hourly 
wage increases that accompanied the working time reductions offset part of the employment 
benefit. For example Taylor (2011) estimates that the employment effects would have been 
twice as strong if they had not been accompanied by such strong hourly wage increases. On 
the other hand, labor historians criticize that Roosevelt’s ‘President’s Reemployment Act’ did 
not promote a sustainable working time reduction, but just implemented work-sharing as a 
short-term measure in the crisis. In the early 1930s, the movement for shorter working hours 
was so strong that the 30-hours work-week was discussed as a serious policy option in U.S. 
Congress. After his election, but before taking over office, Roosevelt supported the ‘Black-
Connery 30-Hours Bill’ to reduce working hours to thirty hours, and to limit the import of 
goods produced by workers with longer working hours; the bill was even passed in Senate in 
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April 1933. However, after becoming president, Roosevelt stopped to support the bill, and 
presented the ‘President’s Reemployment Act’ as an alternative (Whaples 1991). In the 
economic recovery after the end of the depression, average weekly work hours slowly 
increased from their low in 1934, and with Roosevelt’s Reemployment Act “the momentum 
toward the thirty-hour week had dissipated” (Whaples 1991). Eighty years later, the thirty-
hour work-week in the U.S. sounds like an utopia. 
 
5.2 Work-Sharing in the 1980s-2000s 
Average hours per worker slowly but gradually declined in the prosperous post-war era, 
which was characterized by strong productivity growth, rising real wages and (almost) full-
employment in many industrialized countries. In the 1970s this so called ‘Golden Age of 
Capitalism’ came to a sudden end, triggered by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the 
oil crisis, as well as a stock market crash (Bowles et al. 1983, Glyn 2006, Marglin and Schor 
1992). Struck by rising unemployment as a consequence of the economic slowdown 
(Stockhammer 2004), in the 1980s several European countries started implementing work-
sharing policies (for an overview, see Bosch and Lehndorff 2001). 
In the mid-1980s, labor unions in West Germany started negotiating reductions in weekly 
working hours at the industry level. The first two industries were the metal and the printing 
sector, where weekly hours were gradually reduced from 40 to 36 hours between 1984 and 
1994; in exchange employers were guaranteed higher flexibility in hours as well as flexibility 
in the distribution of hours between workers (only the average working hours had to average 
to the agreed weekly hours Hunt 1999). The economic and public perception of this work-
sharing policy is ambivalent; but even the most critical prominent study by Hunt (1999) does 
not provide convincing, robust empirical evidence for negative employment effects. Using 
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel from 1984 to 1994 and exploring industry-level 
variation in work hour reductions, Hunt (1999) analyzes the consequences of work-sharing in 
three steps. First, she compares the development of actual hours and standard hours to 
examine the effect of a reduction in the work-week on the extent of overtime work. She finds 
that for blue-collar full-time workers in manufacturing, standard hours fell almost 
concomitantly with actual hours, indicating that overtime work did not offset the reduction in 
working hours. In a second step, she analyzes the development of hourly wages after working 
time reductions and finds that the increases were generally high enough to offset the reduction 
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in earnings due to lower hours, so the unions’ goal of full wage compensation was met. 
Finally, she investigates the employment effects and finds almost no statistically significant 
effects. This stands in contrast to her theoretical predictions of especially strong negative 
employment effects when working time reductions are associated with hourly wage increases 
(Hunt 1999).5 
In France, President Mitterrand increased the minimum wage after his election in 1981, and 
soon after passed a working time reduction from 40 to 39 hours, while only slightly adapting 
overtime pay legislation. Whereas minimum wage workers who were employed during the 
working time reduction were additionally guaranteed full wage compensation, newly hired 
minimum wage workers received less than full wage compensation and were thus relatively 
cheaper to hire for companies. Using data from the French Labor Force Surveys from 1977-
1987, Crépon and Kramarz (2002) conduct a difference-in-difference analysis for the 
immediate and medium-term employment effects of this working time reform, comparing 
workers directly affected by the reform to workers not-affected because they already worked 
36-39 hours a week before. They generally find that workers affected by the reform were 
more likely to be fired than those not affected, both immediately and over the following years; 
however many of their estimates are not statistically significant, which can partly be 
explained by the small control group (of observationally identical workers not affected by the 
reform). While – based on these imprecise estimates – Crépon and Kramarz (2002) conclude 
that the reform generated a “two tiered-wage system … that induced firms to both hire and 
fire”, they provide no convincing evidence for overall negative employment effects. 
Moreover, they acknowledge the difficult economic situation France was facing in the early 
1980s, compared to other European countries. Against that background, they can provide no 
credible counterfactual estimates of overall employment trends in absence of the working 
time reform. 
The most well-known and substantial European work-sharing reform was implemented in 
France in 2000. After a voluntary incentive-based working time reduction in 1996, in 1998 an 
act was passed to reduce the standard weekly hours from 39 to 35. The act became effective 
for most firms in 2000, and for small firms in 2002, and provided incentives to firms for faster 
implementation (Logeay and Schreiber 2006). Moreover, a follow-up act was passed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Based on Hunt’s (1999) empirical findings, the narrative could also be: Work-sharing was 
successful in actually reducing hours (that were not compensated by an increase in overtime 
as sometimes argued); it increased hourly wages; and it had no short-term or medium-term 
negative employment effects. 
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increase flexibility in working hours for the transition period and to temporarily reduce the 
overtime premium. Firms were also granted subsidies in social security contributions. The 
large majority of workers initially received a full wage compensation, however around half of 
all workers had to accept stagnating or only moderately growing wages in the following years 
(Logeay and Schreiber 2006). Using aggregate time-series data for France, Logeay and 
Schreiber (2006) estimate a vector error correction model to generate out-of-sample forcasts 
for labor market variables, inflation, and output for 2000-2001 and compare them to the 
realized values. They find that the policy mix – the work time reduction, in combination with 
social security subsidies, and initial wage compensation – had beneficial employment effects, 
that remain significant when accounting for forcasting uncertainty. Other variables, such as 
output, productivity, or hourly labor costs, by contrast, were only affected temporarily. They 
conclude that this specific work-time reform was a success (Logeay and Schreiber 2006). The 
positive employment and overall effects of the French work-sharing reform are also suggested 
in more descriptive studies (Askenazy 2013, Hayden 2006, Pisani-Ferry 2003). 
The Canadian province of Quebec reduced hours from 44 to 40 between 1997-2000 for 
around 30% of Quebec workers (paid on an hourly basis and not covered by a union contract). 
In contrast to the European work-sharing reforms, this policy was not accompanied by any 
form of wage-compensation. To evaluate its effects on actual hours, employment, and wages, 
Skuterud (2007) conducts a triple-difference analysis comparing hourly paid non-unionized 
workers in Quebec, with observationally identical workers in Ontario, and with salaried 
workers in Quebec. They use data from the Canadian Labour Force Survey from 1996-2002, 
and analyze effects of the reform on hours worked, employment, and wages. While they find 
that hours worked were reduced by around 15-25% in the treatment group (which suggests 
that the reduction was not offset by an increase in overtime work), they find no overall 
employment effects from the policy. If anything, employment effects were slightly negative 
for men, and slightly positive for women. They also find very small to zero wage effects on 
the policy; which is consistent with the policy’s design of not including any form of wage-
compensation. While the authors conclude that this provides credible evidence of the limits of 
work-sharing to increase employment – even in the absence of wage increases, such as in 
Europe, it is important to remember that the policy only includes 30% of workers, so there 
could be some spill-overs from hourly workers to salaried workers – a concern also 
mentioned by the authors. Moreover, their analysis only includes the immediate employment 
effects of the reform, while the medium to long-run effects could be substantially different. 
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5.3. Work-Sharing in the Great Recession 
The strong drop in output in 2008 – that marked the beginning of the Great Recession – led to 
a re-emergence of work-sharing as a labor market policy tool in many European countries 
(Messenger et al. 2013). While in some countries existing short-time work arrangements were 
reformed by extending coverage, duration, and compensation, other countries introduced new 
programs in the recession (for an overview of the programs in the EU see Arpaia et al. 2010, 
as well as Boeri and Bruecker 2011).  
In general, these short-time work arrangements were designed as follows: Companies hit by 
the recession got incentives to temporarily reduce working hours of the existing employees, 
rather than fire a part of the work-force. In several countries (amongst them Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, France, Spain) participating employers were granted cuts in social security 
contributions. Employees were partially compensated for the loss in monthly earnings by 
government transfers, either paid out by the firm (such as in Austria, Germany, France and 
Italy) or by the unemployment insurance system (such as in Denmark, Spain, or the UK). In 
many countries, short-time work was linked to incentives to training for short-time workers, 
in some countries this was even compulsory. The duration of the program varied strongly, 
from two years in Spain or one year in Italy, to only six consecutive weeks in France. In some 
countries, such as Belgium, the initial duration was short, but could be renewed several times 
(Arpaia et al. 2010). Covering almost 5% of employees, the percentage of the labor force 
participating in short-time work arrangements was highest in Belgium, where already in the 
years before the crisis between 2-4 % were in such programs (Cahuc et al. 2011); followed by 
Germany with around 3% (Arpaia et al. 2010). While in some countries short-time work 
policies are still in place, others have reduced eligibility or duration in 2010 when the 
economies recovered. 
An interesting country for analyzing the success of work-sharing to avoid job-losses is 
Germany, where output dropped stronger in the Great Recession than in the US or the average 
European country, while employment even slightly increased in the same period (Herzog-
Stein et al. 2013). Whereas some authors highlight the crucial role of short-time work to 
explain this exceptionally stable development in the labor market (e.g. Boeri and Bruecker 
2011, Brenke et al. 2013, Balleer et al. 2013), others stress that two newly implemented 
working time instruments, working time accounts and discretionary variations in regular 
working time are equally or more important (Möller 2010, Herzog-Stein et al. 2013). The first 
instrument allows to accumulate overtime-hours on a working time account, and to consume 
17	  
	  
it in a later point in time. The second instrument resembles a working time reduction 
negotiated at the firm level between employers and trade unions. Working time reductions are 
therefore a crucial cause of the stability of the German labor market in the Great Recession. 
Despite high institutional variety, a unifying feature of the work-sharing policies implemented 
in the Great Recession is that they were designed specifically as short-run crisis measures – to 
preserve existing jobs in an economic downturn – and thus unlike the reforms of the 1980s 
they did not aim at reducing working time permanently. In the short-run, however, they 
successfully (partially) insulated labor markets from the Great Recession, illustrating the 
potential of work-sharing to keep employment high in an environment of low labor demand. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we discuss the role of work-sharing for a sustainable economy. Work-sharing 
potentially allows for high employment in an environment of low growth, due to a long-lasing 
stagnation or environmental constraints to growth. A more equitable distribution of hours 
worked additionally might come with several positive side-effects, like increased happiness 
and health among those working too long or too short hours, or a narrowed gender wage gap. 
It might also tackle the widening wage and income inequality in recent decades. However, 
many behavioral studies show that income inequality leads to consumption emulation and 
fuels the willingness to work long hours. High income inequality consequently might be seen 
as an obstacle to build public support for work-sharing (e.g. Stiglitz 2008). 
While work-sharing so far has not been implemented for environmental reasons, it has been 
frequently used as a policy tool to maintain or increase employment in recessions. A review 
of the empirical literature on work-sharing suggests that work-sharing was successful in the 
Great Depression in the U.S. and in the Great Recession in Germany, while the results for the 
work-sharing reforms of the 1980s in several European countries are more mixed. However, 
there exists little empirical evidence for negative employment effects of any work-sharing 
reform, whereas several studies point in the opposite direction. We thus conclude that work-
sharing promises to mitigate one of the most pressing issues of our times: How to achieve low 
unemployment in an environment of low growth. 
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